Longstanding and Emerging Legal Issues in Trademark Law

Trademark law protects brand identifiers like names, logos, words, slogans, and other things, ensuring consumers aren’t deceived about the source of a product or service. It also protects businesses from unfair competition. Core concepts include use in commerce, distinctiveness and the likelihood of confusion, which dictate whether a mark can be registered and enforced.

Jack Daniels and Bad Spaniels

Whether you’re a startup founder, an artist, or just astudent of the law, understanding trademark law is essential. Here is a breakdown of the fundamentals, followed by some of the biggest trending issues in the trademark world today.

The Fundamentals of Trademark Law

A trademark is any word, name, drawing, graphic, or device used to identify the source of goods or services and distinguish them from others. The four essential requirements for a valid trademark are:

Distinctiveness

A trademark must operate not only to identify the source of a product or service but also to distinguish it from others.

It is evaluated along a spectrum:

Fanciful marks: These are completely made-up, invented words, graphics, etc. that have nothing whatsoever to do with the nature or quality of the products or services with which they are associated. These are inherently distinctive, meaning it is not necessary to prove that consumers have come to associate the mark with the source. XEROX and EXXON are examples.
Arbitrary marks: These are real words, images of real things, etc., but they bear no relationship to the product or service with which they are associated. APPLE computers is an example. These, too, are inherently distinctive.
Suggestive marks: Suggestive marks are marks that hint at the nature or a quality of the product or service, but do not directly describe it. They require some imaginative thought on the part of the consumer to “connect the dots.” JAGUAR for cars and COPPERTONE for suntan lotion are examples. A suggestive mark is inherently distinctive.
Descriptive marks. These describe a quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the product or service. Unlike suggestive marks, they don’t merely hint at it; they come right out and directly describe the product or service, or a characteristic or ingredient of it. HOLIDAY INN and INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES are examples. Descriptive marks cannot be claimed as trademarks unless they have acquired “secondary meaning.” The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that consumers have come to identify the brand with the claimant’s product or service, and not with other sources of it.
Generic marks: These are names for a category of product or service. MILK, as a mark for milk would be an example. No trademark rights can be claimed in generic marks.

Likelihood of Confusion

The primary legal standard for both registering a mark and suing for infringement is “likelihood of confusion”. This means determining if an ordinary consumer would mistakenly believe that your product or service and someone else’s come from the same source, or are affiliated.

Courts apply a multi-factor test (primarily the DuPont factors) to assess likelihood of confusion. The most critical ones are:

Similarity of the marks: Do they look, sound, or convey a similar commercial impression?
Relatedness of the goods/services

Courts consider other factors, too.

Two marks may be confusingly similar even if they are not identical. The key is whether consumers would be likely to confuse the source of one with the source of the other.

Use in Commerce

A mark must be used in commerce as a source identifier. Otherwise, a trademark does not come into being. To register a trademark federally with the USPTO, the use must be in interstate or foreign commerce. Purely intrastate commerce will not suffice for federal registration.

Registration

In the United States, trademarks come into existence through use in commerce as a trademark. When all the elements of a valid trademark exist (distinctiveness, etc.) a “common law” trademark exists. The scope of protection a common law trademark affords, however, is limited to the geographic area of trade. To get nationwide protection and the right to use the coveted ® symbol, you must register your mark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

My experience has been that the major stumbling blocks for people who apply to register their trademark with the USPTO are (1) lack of distinctiveness, usually due to selecting a descriptive mark without acquired meaning; (2) likelihood of confusion with another person’s or company’s trademark; and (3) improperly completing the application for registration.

Topical Issues in Trademark Law

Fraudulent filings

The USPTO has implemented rigorous enforcement frameworks to crack down on fraudulent filings. Historically, many trademark owners were in the habit of registering their marks in more than one category of goods or services, either to “keep options open” for possible company expansion into a new product line, or to prevent competitors from doing so. The USPTO is making more vigorous efforts to crack down on registrants who fraudulently claim use in connection with goods or services with which they are not actually using the mark.

Due to a massive influx of suspicious, fraudulent, or automated filing mills, the office has cracked down by requiring stricter identity verification and heavily scrutinizing specimens of use. If a brand is caught digitally altering logos or faking mock-ups of their goods in commerce, their registration is being swiftly canceled. Examiners are inspecting specimens of use more closely now, trying to ferret out digitally created mock-ups of trademarks being used in commerce. A false or fraudulent specimen of use is grounds for cancellation of registration.

The Trademark Modernization Act has given the USPTO new and enhanced powers to cancel unused and fraudulent registrations.

AI-Generated Counterfeits

Generative-AI is being used to create knock-offs of digital products. This is creating challenges for owners of trademarks in digital products and services.

Intermediary Platform Liability

Can an online marketplace platform or intermediary website or online service provider be held contributorily liable for facilitating or otherwise contributing to counterfeit and trademark-infringing goods being sold on their platforms?

Phrases Without Trademark Functionality

People are increasingly trying to claim trademark ownership over common words and phrases, such as, “Hello. How are you?” The USPTO and courts are rebuffing a lot of these efforts. It is still possible for a phrase to become a trademark, but proof of acquired secondary meaning as a source identifier is needed. Otherwise, an applicant is likely to experience a “failure to function as a trademark” denial.

Read more about non-AI-related legal issues.

Need help with a trademark registration? Contact attorney Thomas James.

Enduring (Non-AI) Legal Issues

With so much attention being given to the legal issues that AI-powered technologies are generating, it can be easy to overlook or underestimate the importance of long-standing legal issues having nothing to do with artificial intelligence. While it would be neither possible nor particularly useful to catalog all of them in a single blog post, it might be helpful to highlight a few key legal issues that are developing alongside developments in AI law.

Copyright Law

The core principles of intellectual property remain anchored in traditional law. In that connection, it is important to understand the philosophy of copyright. Copyright is not the only kind of intellectual property there is, but it is by far the most common. Everyone who has ever written a story or a poem, scribbled a doodle, or composed an email message is very likely a copyright owner. Merit is not a requirement. In theory, even that terrible drawing of a turkey you made in first grade by tracing your fingers and hand on paper and drawing a head and two legs on it may be protected by copyright. Whether it makes sense to pay the filing fee to register something like that is a different story.

A key issue in copyright law that continues to develop is fair use. Courts have been grappling with how to interpret and apply the four vaguely worded factors they must to make findings about whether a particular otherwise-infringing use is “fair” or not. The idea of “transformative use” is at the center of this evolving doctrine. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts v. Goldsmith, decided in 2023, is a leading case in this area now. Other limitations on copyright infringement liability, such as the safe harbors set out in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), are also important. There are also evolving protections for sound recordings and licensing. Other topics in copyright law include such things as the registration requirement, damages for infringement, diversity, copyright estoppel, the limitations period, the extent of protection for shorter works, compulsory e-book licensing, and circumvention of copyright protection measures.

The Internet Archive lawsuit addressed the phenomenon of digitized e-books and the impact on authors of making them freely available to readers via an online digital library.

The new administrative court for resolving smaller copyright claims, the Copyright Claims Board, is one of the more significant developments in copyright law in a long time. Find out what to know about the new CCB.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2021.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2022.

Read about the top copyright cases of 2024.

Meanwhile, more and more works continue to enter the public domain.

Trademark Law

There has been a surge in interest in trademark law ever since the COVID-19 phenomenon. Many small brick-and-mortar businesses had to shut down as people were instructed to quarantine at home. While quarantining at home, a lot of people had the same idea: Starting a home-based, online business. Those new online businesses needed to have names. The USPTO was soon flooded with an unusually large number of trademark registration applications. Competition in the trademark space became fierce. Descriptiveness and likelihood-of-confusion challenges increased. New laws and procedures, such as the Trademark Modernization Act, were enacted to clear more room for new businesses by cancelling unused trademarks and cancelling registrations for classes of goods and services no longer being used by the trademark owners. Interest in nontraditional marks like color marks, trade dress, and sound and olfactory trademarks (smell marks) has also grown.

The clash between First Amendment values and trademark interests continues to surface from time to time. Courts have addressed trademark speech rights on several occasions now.

And of course, distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and registration disputes are ongoing.

Foundational Context: Major IP Developments of 2023

This section is a repost of an article I wrote in 2023 describing major developments in various areas of intellectual property law that took place that year. While I have broadened the scope of the discussion, it can still be useful to look back at what went on during that pivotal year, as it provides important context for the developments in IP law that are taking place now.

Copyright: Fair Use

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith et al.

I’ve written about this case before here and here. The Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case in May. The decision is significant because it finally reined in the “transformative use” doctrine that the Court first announced in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music back in 1994. In that case, 2 Live Crew had copied key parts of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh, Pretty Women” to make a parody of the song in its own rap style. The Court held that the 2 Live Crew version, although reproducing portions of both the original song and the original recording of it without permission, transformed it into something else. Therefore, even though it infringed the copyright, the 2 Live Crew version was for a transformative purpose and therefore protected as fair use.

In the thirty years since Campbell, lower courts have been applying the “transformative use” principle announced in Campbell in diverse and divergent ways. Some interpretations severely eviscerated the copyright owner’s exclusive right to make derivative works. Their interpretations often conflicted. What one circuit called transformative “fair use” another circuit called actionable infringement. Hence the need for Supreme Court intervention.

In 1984, Vanity Fair licensed one of photographer Lynn Goldsmith’s photographs of Prince to illustrate a magazine article about him. Per the agreement, Andy Warhol made a silkscreen using the photograph for the magazine and Vanity Fair credited the original photograph to Goldsmith. Unknown to her, however, Warhol proceeded to make 15 additional works based on Goldsmith’s photograph withour her permission.. In 2016, the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts licensed one of them to Condé Nast as an illustration for one of their magazines. The Foundation received a cool $10,000 for it, with neither payment nor credit given to Goldsmith. The Foundation then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaration that its use of the photograph was a protected fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. The district court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the Foundation. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the four-factor “fair use” analysis favored Goldsmith. The Supreme Court sided with the Court of Appeals.

Noting that it was not ruling on whether Warhol’s making of works using the photograph was fair use, the Court limited its analysis to the narrow question whether the Foundation’s licensing of the Warhol work to Condé Nast was fair use. On that point, the Court determined that the use of the photograph to illustrate a story about Prince was identical to the use Goldsmith had made of the photograph (i.e., to illustrate a magazine article about Prince.) Unlike 2 Live Crew’s use of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” the purpose of the use in this case was not to mock or parody the original work.

The case is significant for vindicating the Copyright Act’s promise to copyright owners of an exclusive right to make derivative works. While Warhol put his own artistic spin on the photograph – and that might have been sufficient to sustain a fair use defense if he had been the one being sued – the Warhol Foundation’s and Condé Nast’s purpose was no different from Goldsmith’s, i.e., as an illustration for an article about Prince. Differences in the purpose or character of a use, the Court held, “must be evaluated in the context of the specific use at issue.” Had the Warhol Foundation been sued for displaying Warhol’s modifications of the photograph for purposes of social commentary in its own gallery, the result might have been different.

Although the holding is a seemingly narrow one, the Court did take the opportunity to disapprove the lower court practice of ending a fair use inquiry at the moment an infringer asserted that an unauthorized copy or derivative work was created for a purpose different from the original author’s.

Copyright Statute of Limitations and Damages

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy

The U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review this Eleventh Circuit decision. At issue is whether a copyright plaintiff may recover damages for infringement that occurred outside of the limitations period, that is, infringement occurring more than three years before a lawsuit was filed.

The circuits are split on this question. According to the Second Circuit, damages are recoverable only for acts of infringement that occurred during the 3-year period preceding the filing of the complaint. The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, on the other hand, have held that as long as the lawsuit is timely filed, damages may be awarded for infringement that occurred more than three years prior to the filing, at least when the discovery rule has been invoked to allow a later filing. In Nealy, the Eleventh Circuit held that damages may be recovered for infringement occurring more than three years before the claim is filed if the plaintiff did not discover the infringement until some time after it first began.

A decision will be coming in 2024.

Artificial Intelligence

Copyrightability

Thaler v. Perlmutter, et. al.

This was an APA proceeding initiated in the federal district court of the District of Columbia for review of the United States Copyright Office’s refusal to register a copyright in an AI-generated work. In August, the district court upheld the Copyright Office’s decision that an AI-generated work is not protected by copyright, asserting that “human creativity is the sine qua non at the core of copyrightability….” For purposes of the Copyright Act, only human beings can be “authors.” Machines, non-human animals, spirits and natural forces do not get copyright protection for their creations.

An appeal of the decision is pending in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.

Infringement

Many cases that were filed or are still pending in 2023 allege that using copyrighted works to train AI, or creating derivative works using AI, infringes the copyrights in the works so used. Most of these cases make additional claims as well, such as claims of unfair competition, trademark infringement, or violations of publicity and DMCA rights.

I have been blogging about these cases throughout the year. Significant rulings on the issues raised in them are expected to be made in 2024.

Trademark: Parody Goods

Jack Daniels’s Properties Inc. v. VIP Products LLC

For more information about this case, read my blog post about it here.

This is the “parody goods” case. VIP Products used the “Bad Spaniels” name to market its dog toys, which were patterned on the distinctive shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle. VIP filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that its product did not infringe the Jack Daniel’s brand. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for trademark infringement and dilution. Regarding infringement, VIP claimed First Amendment protection. Regarding dilution, VIP claimed the use was a parody of a famous mark and therefore qualified for protection as trademark fair use. The district court granted summary judgment to VIP.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that when an alleged infringer uses the trademark of another (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, it is a commercial, not an expressive, use. Accordingly, the First Amendment is not a consideration in such cases.

Rogers v. Grimaldi had held that when the title of a creative work (in that case, a film) makes reference to a trademark for an artistic or expressive purposes (in that case, Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers), the First Amendment shields the creator from trademark liability. In the Jack Daniel’s case, the Court distinguished Rogers, holding that it does not insulate the use of trademarks as trademarks (i.e. as indicators of the source or origin of a product or service) from ordinary trademark scrutiny. Even through the dog toys may have had an expressive purpose, VIP admitted it used Bad Spaniels as a source identifier. Therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.

The Court held that the same rule applies to dilution claims. The First Amendment does not shield parody goods from a dilution claim when the alleged diluter uses a mark (or something confusingly similar to it) as a designation of source for its own products or services.

Trademark: International Law

Abitron Austria v. Hetronic International

Here, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act does not have extraterritorial reach. Specifically, the Court held that Sections 1114(1)(a) and 1125 (a)(1) extend only to those claims where the infringing use in commerce occurs in the United States. They do not extend to infringement occurring solely outside of the United States, even if consumer confusion occurs in the United States.

The decision is a reminder to trademark owners that if they want to protect their trademark rights in other countries, they should take steps to protect their rights in those countries, such as by registering their trademarks there.

Patents: Enablement

Amgen v. Sanofi

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the validity of certain patents on antibodies used to lower cholesterol under the Patent Act’s enablement requirement (35 U.S.C. 112(a)). At issue was whether Amgen could patent an entire genus of antibodies without disclosing sufficient information to enable a person skilled in the art to create the potentially millions of antibodies in it. The Court basically said no.

If a patent claims an entire class of processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, the patent’s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. In other words, the specification must enable the full scope of the invention as defined by its claims. Amgen v. Sanofi, 598 U.S. ____ (2023)

Patents: Executive Power

In December, the Biden administration asserted that it can cite “excessive prices” to justify the exercise of Bayh-Dole march-in rights. The Biden Administration also has continued to support a World Trade Organization TRIPS patent waiver for COVID-19 medicines. These developments are obviously of some concern to pharmaceutical companies and members of the patent bar.

Conclusion

My vote for the most significant IP case of 2023 was Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith. Lower courts had all but allowed the transformative use defense to swallow up the exclusive right of a copyright owner to create derivative works. The Supreme Court provided much-needed correction. I predicted that in 2024, the most significant decisions would also be in the copyright realm, but that they would have to do with AI. The prediction turned out to be accurate.

Last Exit From Paradise

Copyright law “has never stretched so far, however, as to protect works generated by new forms of technology operating absent any guiding human hand, as plaintiff urges here. Human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright.”

The United States Supreme Court has put an end to Stephen Thaler’s crusade for machine rights. Okay, that’s the sensational news article way of putting it. He wasn’t really crusading for machine rights. He was trying to establish a precedent for claiming copyright in AI-generated works.

I first wrote about this back in May, 2022 (“AI Can Create, But Is It Art?”). At that time, the U.S. Copyright Office had denied registration of “A Recent Entrance to Paradise.” This was an image that was generated by Thaler’s AI tool, the Creativity Machine. Thaler had sought to register it as a work for hire made by the machine. The Copyright Office denied registration because it lacked human authorship.

The decision was consistent with appellate court decisions suggesting that stories allegedly written by “non-human spiritual beings” are not protected by copyright, although a human selection or arrangement of them might be. Urantia Foundation v. Kristen Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1997). Neither are works created by non-human animals, such as a monkey selfie.

Thaler sought review by the federal district court. Judge Howell affirmed the Copyright Office’s decision, writing that copyright law “has never stretched so far, however, as to protect works generated by new forms of technology operating absent any guiding human hand, as plaintiff urges here. Human authorship is a bedrock requirement of copyright.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the refusal of registration. Thaler petitioned for review by the United States Supreme Court. On March 2, 2026, the Court denied review, without comment.

An argument that Thaler advanced in the petition for certiorari was bascially that because images output by a camera are protected by copyright (See Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony), images generated by a computer should be, too.

The Copyright Office has since published guidance explaining that using AI as a tool in the creative process does not categorically rule out copyright protection. Rather, assessments must be made on a case-by-case basis about the nature and extent of human creativity that was contributed.

The narrowest interpretation of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari is that it did not see a need to disturb the ruling that a machine cannot be an “author,” for purposes of copyright law. The facts of the case did not present an opportunity to opine on whether, and under what circumstances, a human can claim to be an author of an AI-assisted creation.

Trademark News

Buc-ee’s, a popular chain of gas-and-convenience stores in the South, has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit against Mickey’s gas stations. According to the complaint:

Consumers are likely to perceive a connection or association as to the source, sponsorship, or affiliation of the parties’ products and services, when in fact none exists, given the similarity of the parties’ logos, trade channels, and consumer bases.

Here are the two logos, side by side for comparison:

Buc-ees and Mickey's logos

Trademark infringement occurs when one company’s logo or other mark is used in commerce in a way that is likely to confuse consumers about the source of a product or service. What do you think, folks? Might a weary traveler mistake a moose for a beaver?

Clean responses only, please.

Trump’s Executive Order on AI

News media headlines are trumpeting that the Executive Order preempts state AI laws. This is not true. It directs this administration to try to strike down some state AI laws. It contemplates working with Congress to formulate and enact preemptive legislation. It is doubtful that a President could constitutionally preempt state laws by executive order.

On December 11, 2025, President Trump issued another Executive Order. This one is intended to promote “national dominance” in “a race with adversaries for supremacy.” To “win,” the Order says, AI companies should not be encumbered by state regulation. “The policy of the United States,” the Order says, is “to sustain and enhance the United States’ global AI dominance through a minimally burdensome national policy framework for AI.” It sets up an AI Litigation Task Force to challenge state AI laws that allegedly do not do that.

Excepted from the Order are state laws on child safety protections, data center infrastructure, and state government use of AI.

Which State AI Laws?

The Order speaks generally about “state AI laws,” but does not define the term. In fact, AI legal issues are wide-ranging. Here are some examples of state AI laws:

Stalking and Harassment

A North Dakota statute criminalizes using a robot to frighten or harass another person. It defines a robot to include a drone or other system that uses AI technology. (N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.(1), (2)(f)). This appears to be a “state AI law.” North Dakota statutes also prohibit stalking accomplished by using either a robot or a non-AI form of technology. (N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-17-07.1(1)(d)). Preempting this statute would produce an anomalous result. It would be a crime to stalk somebody unless you use an AI-powered device to do it.

Political Deepfakes

Several states have enacted laws prohibiting the distribution of political deepfakes to influence an election. Regulations range from a prohibition against the distribution of a deepfake to influence an election within a specified time period before the election to requiring disclosure that it is AI-generated. Minn. Stat. § 609.771 is an example of such a regulation. The need for this kind of statute was highlighted in 2024 when someone used AI to clone Joe Biden’s voice and generate an audio file that sounded like Mr. Biden himself was urging people not to vote for him.

Sexual Deepfakes

Both state and federal governments have enacted laws aimed at curbing the proliferation of “revenge porn.” The TAKE IT DOWN Act is an example. Minn. Stat. § 604.32 is another example (deepfakes depicting intimate body parts or sexual acts).

State and federal laws in this area cover much of the same ground. The principal difference is that the federal crime must involve interstate commerce; state crimes do not. The only practical effect of preemption of this kind of state AI law, therefore, would be to eliminate state prohibitions of wholly intrastate sexual deepfakes. If the Executive Order succeeds in its objectives, then state laws that prohibit the creation or distribution of sexual deepfakes wholly within the same state, as some do, would be preempted, with the result that making and distributing sexual deepfakes would be lawful so long as you only transmit it to other people in your state and not to someone in a different state.

Digital Replicas

Many states have enacted laws prohibiting or regulating the unauthorized creation and exploitation of digital replicas. The California Digital Replicas Act and Tennessee’s ELVIS Act are examples. AI is used in the creation of digital replicas. It is unclear whether these kinds of enactments are “state AI laws.” Arguably, a person could use technologies more primitive than generative-AI to create a digital image of a person. If these statutes are preempted only to the extent they apply to AI-generated digital replicas, then it would seem that unauthorized exploiters of other people’s faces and voices for commercial gain would be incentivized to use AI to engage in unauthorized commerceial exploitation of other people.

Child Pornography

Several states have either enacted laws or amended existing laws to bring AI-generated images of what look like real children within the prohibition against child pornography. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1.-27.2—01. The Executive Order exempts “child safety protections,” but real children do not necessarily have to be used in AI-generated images. This kind of state statute arguably would not come within the meaning of a “child safety protection.”

Health Care Oversight

California’s Physicians Make Decisions Act requires a human person to oversee health care decisions about medical necessity. This is to ensure that medical care is not left entirely up to an AI bot. The law was enacted with the support of the California Medical Association to ensure that patients receive adequate health care. If the law is nullified, then it would seem that hospitals would be free to replace doctors with AI chatbots.

Chatbots

Some states prohibit the deceptive use of a chatbot, such as by falsely representing to people who interact with one that they are interacting with a real person. In addition, some states have enacted laws requiring disclosure to consumers when they are interacting with a non-human AI. See, e.g., the Colorado Artificial Intelligence Act.

Privacy

Some states have enacted either stand-alone laws or amended existing privacy laws to ensure they protect the privacy of personally identifiable information stored by AI systems. See, e.g., Utah Code 13-721-201, -203 (regulating the sharing of a person’s mental health information by a chatbot); and amendments to the California Consumer Privacy Act making it applicable to information stored in an AI system.

Disclosure

California’s Generative AI Training Data Transparency Act requires disclosure of training data used in developing generative-AI technology.

The Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act

Among other things, the Texas Responsible AI Governance Act prohibits the use of AI to restrict constitutional rights, to discriminate on the basis of race, or to encourage criminal activity. These seem like reasonable proscriptions.

Trump’s “AI czar,” venture capitalist David Sacks, has said the administration is not gong to “push back” on all state laws, only “the most onerous” ones. It is unclear which of these will be deemed “onerous.”

State AI Laws are Not Preempted

Postscript

Striving for uniformity in the regulation of artificial intelligence is not a bad idea. There should be room, though, for both federal and state legislation. Rather than abolishing state laws, a uniform code or model act for states might be a better idea. Moreover, if we are going to start caring about an onerous complex of differing state laws, and feeling a need to establish a national framework, perhaps the President and Congress might wish to address the sprawling morass of privacy and data security regulations in the United States.

Smelly Trademarks

If you have a distinctive smell, you might be able to claim trademark rights in it.

If it smells like a trademark and it functions like a trademark, it might be a trademark.

Rose-Scented Tires

Sumitomo Rubber Industries has successfully applied for the registration of an olfactory trademark in India. It is the smell of a rose, as applied to tires. India’s Trademark Registry has now accepted it for advertisement.

This is not the first time Sumitomo has secured trademark protection for its smelly tires. In fact, the company’s rosy tire was the first smell mark registered in the United Kingdom, back in 1996.

It’s a Smell World

Since the U.K.’s venture into scent trademarks, smell trademarks have been approved in several other jurisdictions around the world.

In 1999, the European Union accepted an application to register the smell of freshly cut grass as a trademark for tennis balls. It quickly closed the door to scent marks, however, in 2002. In Sieckmann v. German Patent and Trademark Office, trademark protection was sought for a “balsamically fruity” scent with “a slight hint of cinnamon.” The ECJ ruled that a chemical formula did not represent the odor, the written description was not sufficiently clear, precise and objective, and that a physical deposit of a sample of the scent did not constitute the “graphic representation” the applicable trademark law required. This closed the door to smell marks in the EU for many years.

Scent mark registrations have been issued in the United States, though there are only a little over dozen of them. Examples include Play-Doh, Power Plus fruity-scented vehicle lube, and minty fresh bowling balls.

The non-functionality requirement is the biggest obstacle for scent trademarks in the United States. The scent must be non-functional and serve only as a source identifier. Smells intrinsic to the purpose of a product will not qualify. So no trademark protection for the smell of a perfume or air freshener. And sorry, Burger King, probably no trademark for the smell of charred meat, either.

“Graphical Representation”

India’s statute requires trademark applicants to provide a graphical representation of the mark. This is what has stood in the way of smell claims in India all this time. Sumitomo, however, figured out a way to do it. It created a representation of the odor in “olfactory space.”

It worked.

Will Flavor Be the Next Frontier?

It is unlikely that flavors will join smells as registrable brand identifiers. Although theoretically possible, no flavor has ever been registered as a trademark in the United States. The USPTO has expressed doubt that a flavor could ever function as a trademark because it is functional. (TMEP 1202.13). Also, although a dog might do it, consumers normally do not taste a product to determine its origin before deciding whether to buy it. Merchants probably would frown on the practice, as would other customers in the store. Hopefully, stores do not allow dogs to sample products intended for human consumption, either.

Learn about other long-lingering issues in trademark law.

Need help registering a non-traditional trademark? Contact attorney Tom James.

Excuse Me While I KIST the Sky

Sunkist beverage, illustration for Thomas B. James blog post — Sunkist is a trademark of Sunkist, Inc. This image is used for illustrative purposes only. No endorsement, sponsorship or affiliation with any company, product or brand is intended or implied.

The Jimi Hendrix song, “Purple Haze” contains one of the most famous misheard lyrics of all time. Ever fixated on sex and sexuality, many people insist that when he sings, “Excuse me while I kiss the sky,” he is saying, “Excuse me while I kiss this guy.” Kiss the sky and kiss this guy are near-homophones, that is to say, they are phrases that nearly sound alike. In the trademark world, homophones and near-homophones can create or contribute to a likelihood of confusion which, in turn, can result in a denial of registration to one of the marks and/or infringement liability.

Jimi Hendrix also wrote a song called Love or Confusion, but that is a story for a different day. See In re Peace and Love World Live, LLC.

Sunkist Growers v. Intrastate Distributors

Intrastate Distributors, Inc. applied to register KIST, both as a standard character mark and as a stylized mark, for soft drinks. Sunkist, Inc. filed an opposition to registration with the Trademark Trials and Appeals Board (TTAB), arguing that KIST is confusingly similar to SUNKIST, when used in connection with beverages. The TTAB dismissed the opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion.

On July 23, 2025, the U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.

The DuPont Factors

Likelihood of confusion is a question of law that requires weighing of findings of fact on the DuPont factors. This list of factors comes from E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Celanese Corp., a 1973 case that identified 13 factors relevant to likelihood-of-confusion analysis:

Similarity of the marks
Nature of the goods and services
Trade channels
Conditions of purchase (e.g., whether buyers of the product or service are likely to carefully consider options before purchasing, or are more likely to make a quick or impulsive purchasing decision.)
Fame
Number of similar trademarks used with similar goods or services
Actual confusion
History of concurrent use, if any
Variety of different products and services with which the trademark is used
Interactions and relationship between the applicant and the trademark owner
Extent of the applicant’s right to prevent others from using the trademark on specific goods or services
Potential confusion
Any other relevant information.

The analysis may focus on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods. Also, as a general rule, the more related the goods or services are, the less similar the marks need to be to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

In this case, the Board found four factors supported a finding of likelihood of confusion, but determined that KIST and SUNKIST were dissimilar. The Board believed they had different commercial impressions. KIST, the Board believed, referenced a kiss, while SUNKIST referenced the sun.

The Board relied on some of IDI’s marketing materials that depict a pair of lips adjacent to the word KIST. The Court of Appeals, however, noted that lips do not appear next to the word in all of the marketing materials. Nor was the image of lips claimed as part of the trademark. Therefore, the Court held that the Board’s finding that KIST references a kiss was not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court also determined that Sunkist did not always depict an image of a sun adjacent to its mark SUNKIST.

In short, when considered as standard character marks, not as design marks, SUNKIST and KIST are substantially similar and consumers are likely to confusedly believe that beverages using either of these marks come from the same source.

Confusing Similarity

Two marks may be confusingly similar if they are similar as to appearance, sound, meaning, or commercial impression. (TMEP 1207.01(b).) The test is not whether the two marks are linguistically distinguishable, but whether they are likely to give a consumer the impression that there is a commercial connection between them.

When assessing the likelihood of confusion between compound words, courts may appropriately identify a part of the term as the dominant part and other parts as peripheral. If the dominant part is distinctive, then greater weight may be assigned to the similarity between the dominant parts of two marks than to the peripheral parts. Thus, for example, regarding CYNERGIE and SYNERGY PEEL, the TTAB determined that SYNERGY was the dominant part of both marks, and that CYNERGIE and SYNERGY were sound-alikes. Consequently, they were confusingly similar. (TEMP 1207.01(b)(viii).)

Although the Court of Appeals did not invoke this particular rationale in its KIST decision, it seems to me that this doctrine also would support a determination that KIST and SUNKIST are confusingly similar. KIST is the dominant part of both marks and it is distinctive.

Conclusion

Changing the spelling of, or adding or subtracting peripheral parts from, an existing trademark is not often likely to solve a likelihood of confusion problem, particularly when the goods or services are identical, similar, or related. A standard character trademark search should look not only for identical matches but also for words and phrases which, although not identical, might look or sound similar, in whole or in part, or have meanings similar to the one you are trying to clear.

Read about other non-AI trademark issues.

Voice Cloning

Nipper, painting of dog listening to phonograph, by Francis Barraud (1898-1899) — Painting of Nipper by Francis Barraud (1898-99); subsequently used as a trademark with “His Master’s Voice.”

Voice cloning is one of the generative-AI technologies that I have described as a perfect tool for the age of deception. Now the issues it raises are reaching the courts.

Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc.

On July 10, 2025, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York issued an Order granting in part and denying in part a motion to dismiss a putative class action lawsuit that Paul Lehrman and Linnea Sage commenced against Lovo, Inc. The lawsuit, Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc., alleges that Lovo used artificial intelligence to make and sell unauthorized “clones” of their voices.

Specifically, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs are voice-over actors. For a fee, they read and record scripts for their clients. Lovo allegedly sells a text-to-speech subscription service that allows clients to generate voice-over narrations. The service is described as one that uses “AI-driven software known as ‘Generator’ or ‘Genny,'” which was “created using ‘1000s of voices.'” Genny allegedly creates voice clones, i.e., copies of real people’s voices. Lovo allegedly granted its customers “commercial rights for all content generated,” including “any monetized, business-related uses such as videos, audio books, advertising promotion, web page vlogging, or product integration.” (Lovo terms of service.) The complaint alleges that Lovo hired the plaintiffs to provide voice recordings for “research purposes only,” but that Lovo proceeded to exploit them commercially by licensing their use to Lovo subscribers.

This lawsuit ensued.

The complaint sets out claims for:

Copyright infringement
Trademark infringement
Breach of contract
Fraud
Conversion
Unjust enrichment
Unfair competition
New York civil rights laws
New York consumer protection laws.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.

The copyright claims

Sage alleged that Lovo infringed the copyright in one of her voice recordings by reproducing it in presentations and YouTube videos. The court allowed this claim to proceed.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s unauthorized use of their voice recordings in training its generative-AI product infringed their copyrights in the sound recordings. The court ruled that the complaint did not contain enough factual detail about how the training process infringed one of the exclusive rights of copyright ownership. Therefore, it dismissed this claim with leave to amend.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of output infringement, i.e., claims that the “cloned” voices the AI tool generated infringed copyrights in the original sound recordings.

Copyright protection in a sound recording extends only to the actual recording itself. Fixation of sounds that imitate or simulate the ones captured in the original recording does not infringe the copyright in the sound recording.

This issue often comes up in connection with copyrights in music recordings. If Chuck Berry writes a song called “Johnny B. Goode” and records himself performing it, he will own two copyrights – one in the musical composition and one in the sound recording. If a second person then records himself performing the same song, and he doesn’t have a license (compulsory or otherwise) to do so, that person would be infringing the copyright in the music but not the copyright in the sound recording. This is true even if he is very good at imitating Berry’s voice and guitar work. For a claim of sound recording infringement to succeed, it must be shown that the actual recording itself was copied.

Plaintiffs did not allege that Lovo used Genny to output AI-generated reproductions of their original recordings. Rather, they alleged that Genny is able to create new recordings that mimic attributes of their voices.

The court added that the sound of a voice is not copyrightable expression, and even if it were, the plaintiffs had registered claims of copyright in their recordings, not in their voices.

The trademark claims

In addition to infringement, the Lanham Act creates two other potential bases of trademark liability: (1) false association; and (2) false advertising. 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(A) and (B). Plaintiffs asserted both kinds of claims. The judge dismissed these claims.

False association

The Second Circuit court of appeals recently held, in Electra v. 59 Murray Enter., Inc. and Souza v. Exotic Island Enters., Inc., that using a person’s likeness to create an endorsement without the person’s permission can constitute a “false association” violation. In other words, a federally-protected, trademark-like interest in one’s image, likeness, personality and identity exists. (See, e.g., Jackson v. Odenat.)

Although acknowledging that this right extends to one’s voice, the judge ruled that the voices in this case did not function as trademarks. They did not identify the source of a product or service. Rather, they were themselves the product or service. For this reason, the judge ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show that their voices, as such, are protectable trademarks under Section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.

False Advertising

Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. sec. 1125(a)(1)(B)) prohibits misrepresentations about “the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of . . . goods, services, or commercial activities.” The plaintiffs claimed that Lovo marketed their voices under different names (“Kyle Snow” and “Sally Coleman.”) The court determined that this was not fraudulent, however, because Lovo marketed them as what they were, namely, synthetic clones of the actors’ voices, not as their actual voices.

Plaintiffs also claimed that Lovo’s marketing materials falsely stated that the cloned voices “came with all commercial rights.” They asserted that they had not granted those rights to Lovo. The court ruled, however, that even if Lovo was guilty of misrepresentation, it was not the kind of misrepresentation that comes within Section 43(a)(1)(B), as it did not concern the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of the voices.

State law claims

Although the court dismissed the copyright and trademark claims, it allowed some state law claims to proceed. Specifically, the court denied the motion to dismiss claims for breach of contract, violations of sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, and violations of New York consumer protection law.

Both the common law and the New York Civil Rights Law prohibit the commercial use of a living person’s name, likeness or voice without consent. Known as “misappropriation of personality” or violation of publicity rights, this is emerging as one of the leading issues in AI law.

The court also allowed state law claims of false advertising and deceptive trade practices to proceed. The New York laws are not subject to the “nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” limitation set out in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

Conclusion

I expect this case will come to be cited for the rule that copyright cannot be claimed in a voice. Copyright law protects only expression, not a person’s corporeal attributes. The lack of copyright protection for a person’s voice, however, does not mean that voice cloning is “legal.” Depending on the particular facts and circumstances, it may violate one or more other laws.

It also should be noted that after the Joe Biden voice-cloning incident of 2024, states have been enacting statutes regulating the creation and distribution of voice clones. Even where a specific statute is not applicable, though, a broader statute (such as the FTC Act or a similar state law) might cover the situation.

Images and references in this blog post are for illustrative purposes only. No endorsement, sponsorship or affiliation with any person, organization, company, brand, product or service is intended, implied, or exists.

The Fundamentals of Trademark Law

Distinctiveness

Likelihood of Confusion

Use in Commerce

Registration

Topical Issues in Trademark Law

Fraudulent filings

AI-Generated Counterfeits

Intermediary Platform Liability

Phrases Without Trademark Functionality

Share this:

Like this:

Copyright Law

Trademark Law

Other Legal Topics

Foundational Context: Major IP Developments of 2023

Copyright: Fair Use

Copyright Statute of Limitations and Damages

Artificial Intelligence

Copyrightability

Infringement

Trademark: Parody Goods

Trademark: International Law

Patents: Enablement

Patents: Executive Power

Conclusion

Share this:

Like this:

Trademark News

Share this:

Like this:

Which State AI Laws?

Stalking and Harassment

Political Deepfakes

Sexual Deepfakes

Digital Replicas

Child Pornography

Health Care Oversight

Chatbots

Privacy

Disclosure

The Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act

State AI Laws are Not Preempted

Postscript

Share this:

Like this:

Rose-Scented Tires

It’s a Smell World

“Graphical Representation”

Will Flavor Be the Next Frontier?

Share this:

Like this:

Sunkist Growers v. Intrastate Distributors

The DuPont Factors

Confusing Similarity

Conclusion

Share this:

Like this:

Lehrman v. Lovo, Inc.

The copyright claims

The trademark claims

False association

False Advertising

State law claims

Conclusion

Share this:

Like this: